Secret justice? – ‘A Local Authority and H’
February 17, 2012 Leave a Comment
Picture the scene if you will…
Witnesses and evidence suppressed…..
Judgments given without parties present…..
Case reports redacted…..
Injunctions issued to prevent public disclosure of party names or case circumstances…..
Case, court and party locations censored…..
Parties deprived of basic human rights and liberty without being given the reason at the time of the judgment…..
You would be forgiven for thinking that I am describing the infamous star chamber (1) court abolished in the 16th century, or perhaps a post ‘war on terror’ case involving the security services, espionage, terrorism or other issues of national security under which secret trials far too often today take place.
You would however be wrong…..
I am in fact talking about the Court of ‘Protection’ (2) a court created under the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA) (3) with jurisdiction to rule on the administration of property and other personal affairs of vulnerable persons deemed by the court in accordance with the MCA to lack the mental capacity to make decisions for themselves, with many cases being brought by local authority social services departments.
In the years since its creation, this court has been heavily criticised both from within (4) and from out-with (5) regarding its apparently secretive methods, highlighted particularly by the fact that many cases go completely unreported, and those which are reported are often heavily anonomised and censored.
Such were the circumstances on the 27th January when the Court handed down the heavily censored judgment in the case ‘A Local Authority and H’ (6) of which even the case name tells nothing, not even the name of the local authority which brought the case. Due to its subject matter, this is a case with potential to generate controversy if not over the secret nature of the proceedings, certainly over the content of the judgment, the essence of which is that ‘H’, a 29 years old autistic woman with mild learning difficulties and an alleged IQ of 64, has effectively been banned by the court from engaging in sexual activity.
Due to the nature of the case, and thanks to the court order, this constitutes the full extent of which the report identifies the parties, and other than the names of solicitors and advocates presenting, nothing else is given to substantiate the identity of either party, or the geographic location where the case circumstances occur. No one can report anything on the case other than that information released in the heavily censored report without committing a contempt of court, making it very difficult to form any opinion on the case itself, its background and impact.
What the report does show and the core case facts are that H is highly sexualised with a long history of sexual promiscuity as recorded by the social and psychiatric services in the case, facts which are due largely to H’s alleged diminished mental capacity (7). This diminished capacity finding based on H allegedly not understanding how to say no and not understanding the risk of sexually transmitted infections leaves H incapable in the courts mind of consenting to sexual activity, facts which have seemingly led to H being exploited and abused sexually over the years, including an attempted rape in 2003.
In order to enforce the ruling, H is under 24 hour care and is not allowed to leave care alone despite having previously enjoyed part time employment. Additionally anyone who attempts to engage H in sexual activity is open to prosecution for a rape offence.
Clearly, this ruling represents not only a significant deprivation of H’s liberty, potentially in contravention of Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights (8) (ECHR), but it also represents significant infringements of what many would consider her natural human right to autonomy of person, self determination, and of her rights under Article 8 ECHR to respect for private and family life. There is no mention whatsoever in the case report of any consideration of Convention rights or the Human Rights Act 1998 which enables direct application of convention rights under English law.
This however may not be an issue given that the MCA was amended in 2007 by the Mental Health Act 2007 to include what are known as the Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards (9) intended to ensure that any deprivation of liberty under the MCA is in accordance with the meaning of Article 5 ECHR which includes under Art 5(1)(e) an exception allowing deprivation of liberty regarding those of ‘unsound mind’.
It seems possible therefore that the judgment is rightly in accordance with human rights law. This however does not make me feel any easier about the case; indeed the point of this article is not to analyse and balance the finer points of mental health and human rights law, but to highlight what I find to be the more questionable aspects of the judgment of broader concern.
Firstly, the case demonstrates the application of an oddly negative method of ‘protection’ involving the removal of rights rather than their reinforcement, which arguably could be seen by some almost as an indirect punishment for suffering a mental illness (10) (although it is clear from the judgment that this IS NOT the intention of the court, and I am not suggesting that it ever is).
such removal of rights does however appear from the bare facts in this case to be the path of least resistance, particularly where the reason for the protection order is to prevent H from exploitation, sexual assault and potential illness, but without any possible alternative solutions being considered. While the intention to protect H from such circumstances is positive, never-the-less the circumstances to be protected from are not the fault of H but are instead the fault of the morally questionable and potentially criminal intentions of others who would exploit her.
Yet H is the one to suffer curtailment of her rights because of them.
The MCA itself requires ‘the least restrictive approach’ to be adopted in protection orders; I am not convinced in this case that some other form of protection could not have been considered rather than H being forcibly subjected to what amounts to ‘shut in’ conditions. If she is already under 24 hour care, surely it must be possible to ensure some less restrictive form of monitoring of potential relationships other than a line being drawn over which H may not cross.
Secondly there may be problems with the longevity and scope of the order.
The case report states that the situation regarding the protection order is to be monitored for change in accordance with the continuing education of H regarding relationship issues; however the report also suggests that H’s condition is unlikely to improve in the short term (para 32) which in turn suggests that the deprivation order could continue indefinitely.
This could therefore become an unacceptable situation given that it would have enormous impact on the ability of H to even have the opportunity of forming any type of relationship other than with her carers. The fact that H is stated to have part time employment amongst other things shows enjoyment of some of the rights of adulthood; she is also stated at para 5 to have only ‘mild learning difficulties’ suggesting that while she may have problems, they may not be of a type to rob her of adult understanding. Clearly H is not a child, and should not be deprived of life and treated as such.
There are also questions regarding the wider implications of the order on H’s liberty. The court considered as per paragraph 33 on the issue of whether H had the capacity to marry, but declined to rule on this issue despite explicitly recognising a close connection between sex and marriage and that H would also therefore likely lack the capacity to marry. It would be preferable if they had gone on to rule on this point, the fact that they did not suggests avoidance of a potentially even more controversial ruling, regardless of the fact that the current ruling would in any event probably prevent H from ever being in a position to pursue any form of relationship or marriage.
The ruling therefore has far wider implications on H’s liberty than merely stopping her from engaging in sexual activity.
Lastly I have problems with the overt secrecy of the case. The fact that no one other than the lawyers and the court can be identified is troubling. It is entirely understandable why the case is redacted, it is a case of highly private implication for H. However given the nature of the decision, it is arguable that a court with the power to make deprivation of liberty orders under such circumstances should be more open to public scrutiny, particularly where as stated atPara19 there is no appeal from the courts decision.
It also seems right that when judgment is handed down in such important cases, case parties really should be present and given the reasons why the orders are being made, which in this case didn’t seem to be considered a necessity as indicated by the following passage:
‘On 15 December 2011 I made an order declaring H’s incapacity in many respects and making best interests declarations as to her future care. In particular I made an order declaring that H lacked capacity to consent to sexual relations and a consequential order to protect her best interests which was very restrictive and undoubtedly amounts to the deprivation of liberty. In those circumstances I reserved my reasons for making these orders with a view to handing them down without the need for attendance of any party. This I now do’
Clearly the orders against H were made more than a month before reasons for them were even given, and even then none of the parties were deemed as of significant enough importance to be given reasons at the time, or to be personally in court at the later date to hear the reasons when handed down.
In conclusion, I do not think there is anything wrong in principle with having a court empowered to make reasoned decisions for the protection of those who cannot decide for themselves, and in the case of H there seems good reason for the orders based on the case report which explains the abuse she has suffered in the past.
However given the bald nature of the report and the lack of detail, particularly regarding the expert evidence upon which the judgment was based, the decision itself in terms of procedure, secrecy and indeterminate scope is open to further questioning.
Clearly the secretive nature of this court and the methods by which it conducts its business, while possibly necessary to protect those the subject of its decisions, do severely work against it in terms of certainty and trust.
Mike Farrell, February 2012.
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